Helen Marasco v. Joane Pappas White : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Helen Marasco v. Joane Pappas White : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael F. Skolnick; Kipp and Christian; Attorney for Appellee.
William R. Hadley; Hadley and Hadley; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Marasco v. White, No. 20070998 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/610
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HELEN MARASCO, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
V 3 . 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellate No.: 20070998 
District Ct. No.: 060701108 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, CITY OF PRICE, CARBON COUNTY, UTAH GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE PRESIDING. 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN. P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
10 Exchange Place. 4lh Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
William R. Hadley 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Rd.#204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 6 2008 
I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Helen Marasco (hereinafter "Mrs. 
Marasco"), and the Appellee, Joane Pappas White (hereinafter "Pappas White"). 
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IV. 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j). Jurisdiction is now properly vested in the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Pappas White's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissing Mrs. Marasco's complaint for professional negligence 
against Pappas White? 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, we review the facts and inferences from them in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. We review the conclusions of law for 
correctness and give no deference to the trial court. Larson v. Overland Thrift 
and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991) citations omitted. 
Additionally, '[f]or moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it must 
establish a right to judgment based upon the applicable law as applied to the 
undisputed facts. 3D Construction and Development v. Old Standard Life 
Insurance Co., 2005 Utah App. 277. Quoting Smith v. Four Corners Health 
Center. Inc., 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003). 
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"[W]e resolve all doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy." Brigham Young University v. Tremco 
Consultants, Inc.. 2005 UT 19 (Utah 2005.). 
2. Was summary judgment appropriate based upon issue preclusion, a.k.a., collateral 
estoppel? 
The four elements of issue preclusion, of which all four elements must be met to 
support such a finding, are as follows: 
1. The party against whom an issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party 
to or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication. 
2. The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action. 
3. The issue in the first action must have been completely, fully and fairly 
litigated. 
4. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 3D 
Construction and Development v. Old Standard Life Insurance Co., 2005 Utah 
App. 277 f 27 (Utah 2005). 
"The trial court5 s determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents 
a question of law...[which] we...review for correctness." Macris & Assoc. Inc. 
v.NewaysJnc 2000 UT 93 f 17. "We review such questions for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial court." Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 
UT App 326, 1 8. 
If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no preclusion. 
Hill v. Smith First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241,245 (Utah 1992). The burden 
of establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on Zufelt, the party 
invoking the doctrine in this case." Zufelt Id, f^ 9. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 56 (c) of the U.R.Civ.P. is the sole determinative authority on appeal. 
Rule 56 (c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Mrs. Marasco brought this action to recover damages for legal malpractice 
when Pappas White, in her role as attorney for Mrs. Marasco, failed to file an action to set 
aside or amend a deed with a mistake in the deed description within the three-year statute of 
limitations. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). 
Pappas White filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging issue preclusion or 
collateral estoppel upon the claim of mistake. The basis of her argument was that the issue 
of mistake had been decided in a prior proceeding, and therefore her failure to file an action 
to set aside or amend the deed caused no damage to Mrs. Marasco, and thus, there was no 
legal malpractice committed by her. 
B. Course of Proceedings at Trial Court Level. 
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Mrs. Marasco filed her complaint on December 11, 2006. Judge James L. Shumate 
was assigned to the matter after recusal by Judge Lyle Anderson. Appellee filed her answer 
on February 5, 2007. A Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum was 
filed by Appellee on May 21, 2007. Appropriate responsive memorandums were filed 
respectively on July 2, 2007 by Mrs. Marasco and July 18, 2007 by Appellee. Oral 
arguments were heard before the Honorable James L. Shumate on October 4,2007 with the 
bench granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that day. An Order of Dismissal 
was signed on November 6, 2007 by Judge Shumate with the Order being entered on 
November 16, 2007. Notice of Appeal was filed on December 13, 2007. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Helen Marasco is a widow whose husband died in 1992 and she inherited the 
bulk of his estate. (Record at 65, #1.) 
2. In January 1993 Mrs. Marasco had in place an estate plan with a will and trust 
giving her estate equally to her two children, Terry Marasco and Trudy 
Markosek. (Record at 65, # 2.) 
3. Mrs. Marasco met with Richard H. Bradley, a Salt Lake City, Utah attorney, 
in mid-1999 for discussions about amendments to her estate plan. (Record at 
65, #3.) 
4. On October 1, 1999 Mrs. Marasco signed and had recorded with the Carbon 
County Recorder a Quit Claim Deed giving her home, real property and 
surrounding acreage of approximately 7.5 acres located at 3545 North 1130 
West, Helper, Utah to her son, Terry Marasco. (Record at 65, # 4, and 114, 
#2.) 
5. On November 30, 1999 Mrs. Marasco signed a new will and trust completed 
by Richard H. Bradley. (Record at 65, # 5.) 
6. Mrs. Marasco had some questions about the will and trust and contacted 
attorney Nick Sampinos of Price, Utah who she considered her family attorney. 
Mr. Sampinos discovered, by his review of the Carbon County Recorder's 
records, that the Quit Claim Deed signed on October 1,1999 by Mrs. Marasco 
had transferred her home, yard and surrounding farm acreage and out-
buildings to her son, Terry Marasco. This information was relayed to her on 
January 20, 2000. (Record at 65, # 6 and 128 p 38 line 1 to p 39 line 5.) 
7. Mrs. Marasco became very upset when this was explained to her because it 
was her intent to keep the home and surrounding yard for herself and her trust, 
and give only the farm acreage and out-buildings to her son, Terry Marasco. 
(Record at 65, # 7, Record 128 p 38, line 24 to p 39 line 5.) 
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8. Mr. Sampinos, due to other professional duties, and to avoid a conflict of 
interest, discussed the matter with attorney, Joane Pappas White, Appellee. 
(Record at 66, # 8, Record at 128, p 39 line 6 to line 20.) 
9. Mr. Sampinos sent a letter to Pappas White on March 30, 2000 regarding the 
matter. (Record at 135-6.) 
10. Pappas White was subsequently retained by Mrs. Marasco and an 
attorney/client relationship was established between Mrs. Marasco and 
defendant regarding the matter of the wrongfully executed deed and other legal 
matters. (Record at 138-145.) 
11. Pappas White sent letters to various parties indicating that she was the attorney 
representing Mrs. Marasco in the matter of the wrongfully described deed and 
other legal matters. In these letters the deed and a lawsuit regarding this deed 
were specifically referenced. (Record at 138-148.) 
12. There is a three-year statute of limitations upon mistake and fraud claims in the 
State of Utah. (Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3)). 
13. Mrs. Marasco discovered that Pappas White had failed to file an action to set 
aside or amend the quit-claim deed upon the basis of mistake within the three-
year statute of limitations which had run on October 2, 2002. 
14. Mrs. Marasco then hired attorneys, Sarah Henry and Ned Stone to represent 
her in the matter and an action for return of the property was filed against her 
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son, Terry Marasco, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Carbon County, 
Utah under Helen Marasco v. Terry Marasco (hereinafter referred to "the 
Marasco case") Case No. 030700583 before the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner. 
(Record at 113-121.) 
15. The causes of action relied upon in the Marasco case to set aside or amend the 
deed were (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty, (4) fraud, (5) mistake, (6) constructive trust, and (7) quiet title. (Record 
at 118, #1.) 
16. The court in the Marasco case dismissed as time-barred the claims of fraud and 
mistake. (Record at 86 lines 15-17, record atl04 lines 6-9, record at 115, # 10, 
and record at 120, #12, record at 104, lines 3-9.) 
17. The Marasco court dismissed on the merits the five surviving causes of action 
alleging that there was no "inequitable conduct by the defendant [Terry 
Marasco]" to invalidate the deed. (Record at 120-121, #16.) 
18. Findings of Fact (hereinafter "FOF") and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter 
"COL") and an appropriate Order were drawn up by Terry Marasco's 
attorneys, D. David Lambert and Helen H. Anderson, and submitted and 
signed by the court. (Record at 113-121.) 
19. No appeal was taken by the parties in the Marasco case. 
20. This action for professional malpractice against Pappas White for failing to set 
aside or amend the deed within the three-year statute of limitations upon 
mistake was then filed on December 11, 2006 by Appellant, Helen Marasco 
through counsel, William R. Hadley. (Record at 1-8.) 
21. Pappas White entered her defense and submitted an answer and Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of collateral estoppel alleging that 
the issue of mistake had previously been decided in the Marasco case, and that 
because of such prior decision, no legal malpractice was committed by Pappas 
White. (Record at 9-17 and 27 to 61.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. There are not sufficient facts or findings to determine whether or not Mrs. 
Marasco desired to transfer all of the real property and buildings to her son. The Marasco 
FOF and COL were silent or confusing in this regard and this raises a question of material 
fact, and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. 
B. Only one of the four elements of issue preclusion were met, and summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 
The first element of privity of parties was met. 
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Element two was not met as the issues decided in the prior adjudication were causes 
of action alleging (1) undue influence; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; 
(4) constructive trust; and (5) quiet title. This is a cause of action alleging professional 
negligence by Appellee and is not identical to the prior claims. 
The FOF and COL from the Marasco case were not clear in whether the claim of 
mistake was fully, fairly and completely litigated in the Marasco case. The Marasco FOF 
and COL and references throughout the record indicate that the claim of mistake was time-
barred, and thus by inference, complete, full and fair testimony was not taken upon the issue 
of mistake, thus, the third element of issue preclusion is not met. 
Prior to evidence being taken, Judge Bryner in Marasco ruled the issues of mistake 
and fraud were barred by the statute of limitations. Although the remaining five actions 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits, it was impossible for the claims of mistake and 
fraud to come to a final judgment on the merits due to their dismissal and the fourth element 
of issue preclusion is not met. 
Based upon the above arguments summary judgment was inappropriate and this case 
should be remanded to the district court for trial. 
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ARGUMENT A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THERE ARE 
UNCERTAINTIES, DOUBTS OR INFERENCES UPON ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
A trial court may enter summary judgment only if: 
a. There are no genuine issues of material facts; and 
b. The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. U.R.Civ.P. 56 (c); 
"This court, in considering the Motion for Summary Judgment must view any doubts 
or uncertainties concerning issues of fact in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 624 (Ut. App. 1991). 
"Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences in determining whether there is a 
material issue of fact which precludes Summary Judgment." Robinson v. IHC, 740 P.2d 262, 
263 (Utah App. 1987) citations omitted. 
"[W]e resolve all doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on 
the merits of a controversy." Brigham Young University, Id 
In order to affirm summary judgment it must be shown that the Marasco court 
unequivocally found that Mrs. Marasco did not make a mistake in the deed description. It 
was imperative and absolutely necessary for the Marasco court to have made such a finding 
to support the Appellee's argument of collateral estoppel at the immediate trial level. 
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The record in the Marasco case raises numerous questions as to whether Mrs. Marasco 
wished to transfer all of the real property to her son or just a portion of the property, that 
being the farmed acreage and out-buildings. 
Judge Bryner at the Marasco law and motion hearing on April 7, 2005, stated on 
the record: 
"Thus, there has been a question raised as what she intended transfer, what 
she intended to transfer by the deed. This is a question of mistake, not a 
question of undue influence. The Court has previously ruled that the claim 
of mistake is time-barred. The statute of limitations with regard to mistake 
had expired before the complaint had been filed." (Record at 104, lines 3-
9). 
The Marasco FOF then read: 
"3. The property described in the deed in question ("the Property") 
consists of approximately 7.5 acres and has several different uses, 
including: the home in which Helen Marasco resides; acreage which 
is farmed by Terry Marasco; and a mobile home in which Terry's 
son (Helen's grandson) and his family reside." 
4. Helen Marasco stated in her testimony that she intended to make a 
lifetime transfer of the farm portion of the property to her son, Terry 
Marasco. 
5. Helen Marasco claims that the deed contained a mistake in the 
description and that only the farm portion of the property should 
have been included in the transfer." (Record at 114.) 
The question of mistake is again raised in the Marasco FOF #10: 
"Helen's testimony was consistent with [attorney] Richard Bradley's except 
that she testified that she only wanted to transfer the farm and not the 
residence. This raises a question of mistake, not a question of undue 
influence, and before taking evidence the court ruled that the claim of 
mistake is time-barred." (Record at 115). 
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Confusion is added when the court states in COL#6: 
"The court concludes that it was plaintiffs intent and her own will to 
transfer the property to the defendant, and that the defendant has met his 
burden of proof to show no actual undue influence." (Record at 119.) 
Again, this conclusion seems to indicate that the court ruled on the transfer of the 
property based only upon undue influence, not on the question of mistake, as immediately 
following this in COL #10 the court states: 
"Thus, the claim under the facts presented is that of mistake in the deed 
description." (Record at 119.) 
Thereafter the court restates in COL #12: "Any claims of mistake or fraud are 
time-barred by Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3)." (Record at 120). 
These findings and conclusions are at the least confusing, vague and inconsistent.1 
By the court's own statements and various findings and conclusions it appears that 
the court's hands were tied as to the issue of mistake. Without the mistake claim to fall 
back on, the court had no choice but to rule for Terry Marasco based upon the five 
surviving causes of action. 
^'Unfortunately, this order is ambiguous as to which portions are dismissed with 
prejudice, so we must construe it accordingly. We construe an ambiguous order under the 
rules that apply to other legal documents. Specifically, we look to the language of the 
order, and we "'[may] resort...to the pleadings and findings. Where construction is called 
for, it is the duty of the court to interpret an ambiguity [in a manner that makes] the 
judgment more reasonable, effective, conclusive, and [that] brings the judgment into 
harmony with the facts and the law. In addition, we construe any ambiguities in the order 
against the prevailing parties who drafted it, which in this case are the defendants." See 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 212, [^15 
(UT, 2001). (Citations omitted.) 
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This is confirmed in the Court's final COL that finds: 
#16 - "There is no rule or factual basis to grant plaintiff relief from the deed 
under her theories of unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty or 
constructive trust. The title of the property is quieted in the defendant 
subject to the life estate described above by plaintiff, nor is there any 
inequitable conduct by the defendant to base the decision to invalidate the 
deed on any ground.55 (Record at 120). 
This Conclusion of Law is clear and on point that only the theories of unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive trust were being ruled upon and 
there was no basis to set aside or amend the deed on only those theories. Nor was there 
any "inequitable conduct by the defendant55, Terry Marasco, to set aside or amend the 
deed. This conclusion said nothing about Mrs. Marasco's actions or inactions. 
Because the Appellee failed to file an action in a timely manner to set aside or 
amend the deed on the basis of mistake, the issue of mistake was never directly addressed 
or ruled upon by the Court. It was simply dismissed as time-barred. Because of the 
dismissal of the mistake claim there was no direct testimony taken upon this issue, and 
thus, there could not be a final ruling by the Marasco court upon the issue of mistake. 
Thus, there is clearly an issue of material fact that was not fully litigated in the 
Marasco case that being: "Did Mrs. Marasco, or did she not, make a mistake in the 
deed description?99. 
Because this ultimate question was not answered in the Marasco case this material 
fact is still outstanding. In reviewing a summary judgment any doubts, uncertainties or 
inferences upon issues of material fact must be decided in favor of the non-moving party, 
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and based upon the confusing and inconsistent statements in the Marasco FOF and COL, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. 
XL 
ARGUMENT B 
THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF ISSUE PRECLUSION WERE NOT MET UPON 
THE MISTAKE CLAIM. 
The doctrine of res judicata, specifically issue preclusion, is fully analyzed in 
Zufelt id. In reviewing a Utah claim of issue preclusion a court must look at the 
following: 
A trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents 
a question of law. We review such questions for correctness, according no 
particular deference to the trial court. 
Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents parties or 
their privies from relitigating issues which were once adjudicated on the 
merits and have resulted in a final judgment. In order for issue preclusion 
to apply, four elements must be present: 
[1] The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a 
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in 
the instant action; [3] the issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no preclusion. 
The burden of establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on Zufelt, 
the party invoking the doctrine in this case. Zufelt id at <|fl[ 8 and 9. 
(Citations omitted.) (See also PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, 2000 
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UT App 20 f^ 5: "The burden of establishing the elements of res judicata is 
upon Westchester in this case." See also Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1184 (Utah 1993): "In raising the defense of collateral estoppel...the party 
invoking this doctrine must demonstrate [all four requirements].") 
Mrs. Marasco disputes the validity of three of these elements. 
Element #1, "The party against whom an issue of preclusion is asserted must 
have been a party to or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication." Mrs. 
Marasco was a party to the prior adjudication, and the first element of issue preclusion 
was met. 
Element # 2, "The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to 
the one presented in the instant action." In the instant action Mrs. Marasco is alleging 
professional negligence against the Appellee for failure to file an action to set aside or 
amend a deed upon the basis of mistake in the deed within the three-year statute of 
limitations. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). 
The definition of attorney professional negligence is: 
"(1) The existence of an attorney/client relationship between the plaintiff 
and defendant; (2) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff; (3) the defendant was negligent in breaching that duty, (4) the 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of actual injuries, loss or 
damage to the plaintiff." (MUJI 7.42). 
In the Marasco case the seven causes of action alleged by Mrs. Marasco 
(represented by attorneys other than Pappas White) were: (1) undue influence; (2) unjust 
enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) mistake; (5) fraud; (6) constructive trust; and 
(7) quiet title. 
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The causes of action that were dismissed in the Marasco case were actions for 
mistake and fraud which definitions are: 
"A mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous 
mental condition, conception, or conviction induced by ignorance, 
misapprehension, or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission 
done or suffered by one or both parties, without its erroneous character 
being intended or known at the time." Utah Coal & Lumber Restaurant, 
Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 Utah 100; 40 P.3d 581, 585 
quoting 27 A. Am. Jur. 2.d Equity § 7 (1996). 
The elements of fraud are: 
"(1) That the defendant made a false or misleading statement to, that the 
defendant either knew the statement was false or misleading, or that the 
defendant made it with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, (2) that the 
statement was of material fact, (3) that the defendant made the statement 
with the intent that the plaintiff would rely on the false or misleading 
representation, and (5) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the false or 
misleading representation, and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a 
result of relying on the false representation." (MUJI 17.1) 
The remaining causes of action in the Marasco case were undue influence, unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty; constructive trust; and quiet title. These are defined 
as follows: 
As to undue influence, it is described as: 
"Where undue influence is charged in connection with the execution and 
delivery of a deed the question is presented as to whether or not another's 
will is substituted for the will of the grantor whereby the grantor was 
induced to execute the deed and it was not his act, but the act of a person 
exerting the undue influence. Richmond v. Ballard, 325 P.2d 839, 7 Utah 
2d 341 (Utah 1958). 
In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment three elements must be met. 
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"First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, 
the conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, 
there must be 'the acceptance or retention of the benefit by the conferee of 
the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Berrett v. 
Stevens. 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) 
Fiduciary duty is defined as: 
"Under Utah law, a fiduciary or confidential relationship will be found only 
"when one party, having gained the trust and confidence of another, 
exercises extraordinary influence over the other party." Gold Standard, Inc. 
V. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996), Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
And constructive trust is defined as: 
"A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the 
person by whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to 
convey it to another on the grounds that its acquisition or retention of the 
property is wrongful and that he would be unjustly enriched if he were 
permitted to retain the property." Restatement, 2nd, Trusts § 1(e). 
Finally, quiet title action is: 
"A proceeding to establish the plaintiffs title to land by bringing into court 
an adverse claimant and their compelling him to either establish his claim or 
be forever after estopped from asserting it." Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th 
Ed., 1979. 
These five actions are not identical to the mistake claim or the professional 
negligence claim that is presented in the instant action, thus element number 2 of issue 
preclusion is not met. 
Element #3 of issue preclusion is: "The issue in the first action must have been 
completely, fully and fairly litigated." 
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Judge Bryner, in the Marasco case, stated that: 
"The defendant moved for dismissal of the causes of action related to fraud 
and mistake on the grounds that such claims were barred by the Statute of 
Limitations, and the Court dismisses the fraud and mistake causes of 
action." (Record at 113.) And: 
"Any issues of mistake or fraud are time barred by Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). 
(Record at 120,112.) And: 
"This is a question of mistake, not a question of undue influence. The 
Court has previously ruled that the claim of mistake is time-barred. The 
Statute of Limitations with regard to mistake expired before the complaint 
was filed." (Record at 104.) (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the issues of mistake and fraud in the first action could not have been 
completely, fully and fairly litigated as the causes of action were dismissed. This 
dismissal of the mistake claim upon the ground of the statute of limitations was noted by 
the Marasco court during law and motion arguments as early as April 7, 2005. (Record at 
78,1104.) and reiterated in the Marasco FOF and COL as signed by Judge Bryner on 
January 13,2006. 
There may have been testimony related to the claim of mistake that came out in 
testimony regarding the other five causes of action, but because of the prior dismissal of 
the fraud and mistake claims, mistake as its own separate claim could not have been, and 
was not, "...completely, fully and fairly litigated." 
Thus, the third element of collateral estoppel is not met and summary judgment 
was inappropriate. 
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Finally, the fourth element of collateral estoppel is "the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits." 
In invoking the defense of collateral estoppel it is critical to keep in mind that 
collateral estoppel "...does not apply to issues that merely 'could have been tried' in the 
prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case." 
International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979). 
In the Marasco case, there was a final judgment on the merits of only the five 
causes of action of (1) undue influence; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty; (4) constructive trust; and (5) quiet title. The mistake and fraud claims were 
dismissed due to the statute of limitations, and thus, they were not taken to a "...final 
judgment on the merits." Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate for failure to 
meet the fourth element of collateral estoppel. 
The party invoking the defense of collateral estoppel has the burden of establishing 
each of the four elements. Appellee has not and can not satisfy all four elements and, 
thus, summary judgment on the theory of collateral estoppel was inappropriate. 
XII. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Marasco court issued its ruling upon only the actions of undue influence, 
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust and quiet title as it had 
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already been determined that the fraud and mistake causes of action were time-barred. 
There was no specific and on-point finding of fact or conclusion of law as to whether or 
not Mrs. Marasco made a mistake in the deed description. This presents an outstanding 
issue of material fact, "Did Mrs. Marasco, or did she not, make a mistake in the deed 
description?" and summary judgment was inappropriate.2 
Because of the numerous conflicting, vague and confusing references in the 
Marasco FOF and COL, and the dismissal of the fraud and mistake claims based upon 
the statute of limitations, the factual question of whether Mrs. Marasco made a mistake 
upon the deed description was never fully fairly and completely litigated. Based upon 
case law that any facts, doubts or uncertainties about an issue of material fact must be 
ruled for in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, this court should reverse the 
summary judgment and allow Mrs. Marasco to have her day in court to present her 
professional negligence claim against the Appellee. 
Further, the four elements of collateral estoppel were not met by the Appellee. 
The burden of proving all four elements of collateral estoppel is upon the party invoking 
such defense and the Appellee failed to meet this burden at the trial level. Specifically, 
the claim of mistake in the prior trial was not "completely, fully and fairly litigated" "on 
2Based upon the theory of collateral estoppel and the Marasco court's COL #10, 
"Thus, the claim under the facts presented is that of mistake in the deed description." it 
may be appropriate for Mrs. Marasco to request summary judgment on this issue should 
this case be remanded. 
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the merits" due to its dismissal early in the Marasco proceedings. Summary judgment 
was not appropriate for this defense and this case should be remanded to the district court 
for trial. 
Although reversing the summary judgment may lead to a time-consuming second 
trial, the law does not concern itself with such a concept if such concept is patently unfair 
to a party. 
Appellee invokes the aid of equity to defeat Mrs. Marasco's cause of action for 
Appellee's own professional negligence. However, "The purpose of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel is to protect a party from being subjected to harassment by being 
compelled to litigate the same controversy more than once. Searle Brothers vs. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), Dissenting Opinion at 694. 
The issue of mistake would have been completely, fully and fairly litigated had the 
Appellee, in her professional capacity as attorney for Mrs. Marasco, timely filed suit to 
set aside or amend the wrongful deed on a claim of mistake. Appellee accepted the 
representation of Mrs. Marasco in the matter, and her own failure to file the action should 
not now be rewarded by her claiming the defense of collateral estoppel. 
The Appellee sat on the case for over two-and a half years allowing the statute of 
limitations to run on the mistake claim. To allow summary judgment to stand in this case 
would, in effect, be rewarding the Appellee for her own negligence in failing to file an 
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action in a timely manner. As a matter of equity her defense of collateral estoppel should 
be denied and summary judgment reversed. 
Based upon these arguments summary judgment was inappropriate and this case 
should be remanded back to the district court for a trial by a fact finder on the 
professional negligence claim against Appellee. 
Respectfully submitted this /<b day of May, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT this {& day of May, 2008, to the following: 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
23 
ADDENDUM 
m 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872) and 
HELEN R ANDERSON (7457), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS A PETERSEN, P.C 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1241 
Provo, Utih 14603 
Telephone: (101) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (S01) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Our FOe No. 25,634 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN MARASCO, 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
TERRY MARASCO, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case Nos. 030W0IW7 and 030700583 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The above captioned matter came on for trial beginning April 6, 2005, and continuing 
through April 7, 2005. The Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, District Judge, presided A jury was 
impaneled and sworn; however, it was concluded by the Court that the jury would be advisory 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(c), and counsel concurred in this regard. 
Prior to the presentation of evidence, the defendant moved for dismissal of the causes of action 
related to fraud and mistake 
the Court dismissed die fraud and mistake causes of action. Each party presented evidence, and at 
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the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant made a motion for involuntary di«mi*m1 piirsuant to 
Utah Rules of CivU Procedure,^ Based on the evidence received and 
good cause appearing, the Court makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Helen Marasco is die mother of Terry Marasco. 
2. The relief sought by Helen Marasco is to invalidate or avoid a deed which was 
executed by her and recorded by the Recorder for Carbon County, State ofUtah, on Octo 
a certified copy of which was received by stipulation as Exhibit 1. 
3. The property described in the deed in question ("the Property91) consists of 
approximately 7.5 acres and has several different uses, including: the home in which Helen Marasco 
resides; acreage which is formed by Terry Marasco; and a mobile home in which Terry's son 
(Helen's grandson) and his family reside. 
4. Helen Marasco stated in her testimony that she intended to make a lifetime transfer 
of the farm portion of the Property to her son, Terry Marasco. 
5. Helen Marasco claims that the deed contained a mistake in the description and that 
only the farm portion of the property should have been included in the transfer. 
6. Larry Larsen is a certified public accountant who has advised Helen Marasco and 
prepared her taxes for more than fifteen years. In 1999, Mr. Larsen suggested that Helen set up a 
2 
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trust, and he arranged for her to meet with an estate planning attorney, R i c ^ ^ 
Teny Marasco was not involved in the disoissums between kff^ 
7. Helen asked Terry to drive her to her initial meeting with Richard Bradley. Terry did 
not know Richard Bradley before that meeting. 
8. In the meeting with Mr. Bradley, Terry asked him if there would be any advantage 
to Helen if the Property were to be transferred to him now rather than through a trust Richard 
Bradley discussed some advantages of a lifetime transfer with Helen and Teny. 
9. The testimony of Richard Bradley, which was received by reading his deposition into 
the record, is that Helen Marasco told him in the first meeting that she intended to make a lifetime 
transfer of the Property to her son, which would include the home and the farm property. Mr. 
Bradley prepared a quitclaim deed to accomplish this purpose. At the time Mr. Bradley did not have 
a legal description for the Property. 
10. Helm'stestimonywasconsistentwithU^ 
she only wanted to transfer the ferm and not Ac residence. This raises a question of mistake, not a 
question of undue influence, and before taking evidence the Court ruled that the claim of mistake 
is time barred. 
11. After the meeting, Richard Bradley mailed Helen some documents to review, 
including a quit-claim deed naming her the grantor and Terry the grantee. The legal description was 
left blank. 
3 
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12. Tcny called the office of a local attorney, George Harmond, and asked if they could 
fill in the legal description. He was told they could. The deed was either sent or delivered to the 
Harmond law office by Terry Marasco, and someone at the Harmond law office prepared the quit 
claim deed with the legal description of the Property. The defendant did not instruct the Harmond 
law office as to the legal description, and the defendant never looked at the legal description or saw 
the deed after its preparation until he saw it in connection with the present legal action. 
13. Some time after speaking with the Harmond law office regarding the deed, Terry 
Marasco notified Helen Marasco that she should go to the office because the deed was ready. Even 
based on the testimony of the plaintiff, the defendant only told her to get dressed and go sign the 
deed. Defendant made no threats nor did he exercise any coercion. His will was not substituted for 
hers, and her free will was not overcome. 
14. On October 1,1999, Helen Marasco signed the completed deed at George Harmond's 
law office. Terry Marasco did not accompany her to the Harmond law office. Someone at the 
Harmond law office caused the deed to be recorded after it was signed by Helen Marasco and 
notarized. 
15. When Helen Marasco signed the deed, she believed she had signed "our place" to 
Terry Marasco, and she acknowledged that "our place" included both the residence and the farm. 
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16. Helen was competent at the time she signed the deed. There is no suggestion of 
undue influence or unfair conduct by Terry Marasco in connection with any of the events 
surrounding the decision to make the deed or the signing of the deed. 
17. Helen had the ability and opportunity to consult ybith independent advisors regarding 
the transactionas evidenced by her lata George 
Harmond also testified that he would have answered any questions she had about the deed as much 
as he could. Mr. Harmond was not representing Terry Marasco at the time. 
18. Marasco and Son Trucking for many years, including the times relevant to this case, 
used a room in Helen Marasco's residence as an office, and a safe was located in the office. 
19. On or about October 5,1999, Helen and Terry had a serious argument regarding some 
money that was missing from the safe located in Helen's home. Terry believed his sister, Trudy, had 
taken it and was upset at Helen for not insisting that Trudy give it back. 
20. As a result of the argument, Helena 
The real reason for this action is that she is angry at Terry about what he said in that argument 
21. Since the argument, Trudy, who has never gotten along with Terry, has assisted and 
encouraged Helen in taking legal action against Terry. 
22. Helen filed this action on June 30,2003. 
23. Helen continues to live in her home on the Property and Terry always intended for 
her to live there as long as she wants to do so. 
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From the foregoing findings of fiict, the Court now makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is an action in equity to avoid the consequences of a duly executed and recorded 
deed conveying property to the defendant, Terry Marasco. Baker v. Patee, 684 P.2d 632,636 (Utah 
1984). The causes of action upon which plaintiff seeks to avoid the deed were: (1) undue influence; 
(2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) fraud; (5) mistake; (6) constructive trust; and 
(7) quiet title. 
2. The Court concludes it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the 
action. 
3. A jury request was made by plaintiff, but in an action to avoid a deed, any 
determination by the jury is advisory and the Court must make and enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, U. R. Civ. P. Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P2d 193 (Utah 2000); 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). 
4. Pursuant to dcfCTdant,sRule41(b)motionfafavoluntarydi 
of the evidence, the court, as the finder of fact, determined the facts as set form above and concluded 
the matter could not be submitted to the advisory jury and that the plaintiffhas not established a right 
to relief under any of her alleged causes of action. 
5. Because Helen Marasco and Terry Marasco are mother and son, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that there was undue influence involved in the giving of the deed by Helen to Terry, 
6 
OUJJ 
however, that presumption may be overcome by proof to a preponderance of the evidence that no 
actual undue influence was used in the making of the deed Baker. 684 P.2d at 637; John.*™ v. 
ifihnaojl, 337 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1959); Robertson v. Campbell. 674 P.2d 1226,1233 n.5; In re 
fiwan'ilEirtflft 293 P.2d 682,686 (Utah 1956). 
6. The Court concludes that it was plaintiffs intent and her own will to transfer the 
Property to the defendant and that the defendant has met his burden ofproofto show no actual undue 
influence. 
7. There is a rebuttable presumption mat a duly executed and recorded deed is intended 
to convey a present interest in the property, and this presun^on may only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. flfffcCTYiPflttCT! 684 P.2d 632,635 (Utah 1984); see also Gold 
Oil LandDevelopmept Corp. v.Davia. 611 P.2d711.712rUtah 19801: Controlled Receivables. Inc. 
vHnrmim. 413 P.2d 807,809 (Utah 1966); Nprthcrat v, WatoBart ft Trust Co,, 248 P.2d 692, 
694 (Utah 1952); Allenv.AUen. 204 P2d 458,460 (Utah 1949). 
8. Once the presumption arising from the relationship is rebutted, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was not intended. 
9. Because sb« intended to transfer the fennb^ 
overcome the presumption of intent created by the deed. 
10. Thus, the claim under the facts presented is that of mistake m the deed description. 
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11. Based on the evidence, the Court concludes that the plaintiflf is not entitled to the 
relief she has requested. The transfer of the property by the quit claim deed which is the subject of 
this action is effective and the Property is owned by trie defendant Terry Marasco. 
12. Any claims of mistake or fraud are time-barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). 
13. The plaintiff has argued that the standard i« ^ mfinmnrg," The term uflfd by plaintiff 
in the pleadings, however, is "undue influence." Besides, the defendant did not do anything that was 
unfair and did not take unfair advantage of the plaintiff. 
14. Regarding the vulnerable adult claim, the defendant did not engage in any conduct 
or practice with the intent to deceive or wrongfully deprive the plaintiff of her property. 
15. The defendant acknowledged and agreed that he intends for Helen Marasco to have 
a life estate in the residence and garage located on the Property, and defendant requested and 
stipulated that the Court should use its equitable powers to order a life estate in that portion of the 
Property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Helen Marasco shall have a life estate in her 
residence and the garage associated with the residence; however, Terry Marasco shall have access 
to the office located in the residence and shall otherwise have reasonable access to the Property that 
does not interfere with her use of the residence and garage during her lifetime. 
16. There is no legal or factual basis to grant plaintiff relief from the deed under her 
theories of unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, or constructive trust, and title to the Property 
is quieted in the defendant subject to the life estate described above by plaintiff nor is there any 
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inequitable conduct by defendant upon which to base a decision to invalidate the deed on any 
ground. 
DATED this / t ? day o£5eecmfer,-2ee5. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT: 
frtfG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE TR#T< 
EDWARD J. STONE, ESQ. 
JOHNSON & STONE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
L-M*moo Twy TSjSO-VJImltm^ct ftct Moood tmimi vaiouipi 
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NICK SAMPINOS 
Attorney at Law 
rth Carbon Avenue 
Jtah 84501 
March 30, 2000 
Joane Pappas White 
Attorney at Law 
475 East Main, Suite 1 
Price, UT 84501 
RE: Helen Marasco 
Dear Joane: 
As you are aware, Helen Marasco has experienced some significant difficulties in the 
recent past with her son Terry. On March 29, 2000, Terry apparently confronted his mother 
again and exhibited some rather hostile feelings towards her. Helen contacted me and indicated 
that she is now ready to proceed with the filing of an action against Terry. 
Helen is interested in recovering possession of her home. As I believe you and I discussed 
several months ago, Helen executed a deed quit-claiming her interest in the home and farm to her 
son Terry. Helen has indicated to me that she was not aware that she was relinquishing her 
interest in her home at the time she signed the deed. In view of that indication, I indicated to 
Helen that it may very well be possible to file an action against Terry to seek recovery of at least 
the home property. 
In view of my current schedule, I've indicated to Helen that I would prefer to refer her to 
you for further assistance. In view of your ongoing representation of Trudy, I felt that it would be 
appropriate to refer Helen to you for further counsel. I believe that Trudy's claims and Helen's 
claims are somewhat similar in nature and a joint action or separate actions filed along the same 
lines would be appropriate. Helen approved of the referral and indicated that she would contact 
you for further assistance. 
I'm enclosing herewith a copy of my entire file dealing with Helen's execution of her Will 
in 1993, subsequent correspondence and documents. We have enclosed a copy of a Trust that 
was prepared by attorney Richard Bradley in Salt Lake City. In all honesty, it is my feeling that 
Helen was better served with the simple Will that was previously executed in 1993. I really do 
not see any need for Helen to be involved in a relatively complex Trust that I believe she has 
difficulty in understanding. 
I believe that the property issues can be sorted out in time. I do feel strongly, however, 
that immediate action needs to be taken to put Terry Marasco on notice that his aggressive and 
hostile attitude toward his mother is inappropriate and will not be tolerated any further. It is my 
further opinion that Terry may be bordering on the brink of committing abuse. I believe that his 
Telephone: (435) 637-9000 
Fax: (435) 637-2111 
nnn?fift 
JoanePappas While 
Attorney at Law 
March 30, 2000 
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verbal attacks are upsetting Helen to the point where she is becoming ill. I also have concern for 
her safety. In talking with her yesterday, Helen indicated that Terry's hostility is worsening and 
she is starting to become a bit concerned about her safety 
I remain hopeful that you will agree to repru 
cerning the contents of my file, please advise. 
Thank you. 
:an answer ai ly questions 
Since; 
/£Lc*fc •'>^^€>77U<D^rjt^^t^ 
Nick Sail ipinos 
Enclosures 
xc: Helen Marasco 
000264 
Mrs. Helen Marasco 
3545 North 1130 West 
Spring Glen, Utah 84526 
Dear Mrs, Marasco: 
Joane Pappas White 
Attorney at Law 
475 East Main - Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
(435) 637-0177 
FAX (435) 637-0183 
October 17, 2001 
When we were last in, CoujrtT Terry's attorney represented to the 
Court that you had never asked Terry to sign a quit-claim deed or 
give you back the title to the 1957 Chevrolet or the water shares 
which are in your's and Tony's names. To help you with that 
process, I have prepared the quit-claim deed and it is enclosed 
with this letter. With respect to the title to the vehicle and 
the water shares, you can ask Terry to give return those 
instruments to you when you take the enclosed deed to him to 
sign. He must sign the deed in the presence of a notary public 
in order to ensure that it is done properly. If you have any 
questions, please feel free to call me. 
Very truly'yours, 
JOAN: 
Attor 
Enclosure 
JPW:sh 
WHITE 
a t Law 
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t °appas White 
ney at Law 
475 East Main - Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
(435) 637-0177 
FAX (435) 637-0183 
'!' 11 ] 
James J. Cordova 
Carbon County Shei^ii 
240 West Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Re: Incident that occurred on May-24, 2 001 
Dear Sheriff Cordova.;. 
On May 24, 2001, T was attorney for Trudy.Markosek in a small 
claims matter before Justice Sto.rrs. We utilized a District 
Courtroom on that date and had one of your deputies assigned to 
us a bailiff. Mrs. Markosek.had brought a small claims matter 
against Marie and Dennis Blanton. Mrs,. Markosek was accompanies 
by her husband, her daughter and her mother, Mrs, Marasco 
'During the time of the Trial, a person entered the back of the 
Courtroom. My back was turned ai *• i 7 hi"! not seen the effect of 
that person's presence in the Courtroom. I did notice that Mrs. 
Markosek became quite agitated and seemed to have difficulty 
concentrating on my questions. i\. \. ..: ; '-:;/ short Trial and w • = 
then exited the Courtroom. On my way out I realized that the 
person sitting at the back of the Courtroom was Terry Marasco. 
Mr. Marasco is the subject of two ongoing Protective Orders in 
favor of his mother, Mr,:, Marasco, and his sister, Trudy 
Markosek. I have enclosed certified copies of those Proi.x:*;e 
Orders for your review. Please note that Mr. 'Lrasco is r.ot to 
have any'communication - contact w'h Trudy / ; Vir r'amil/. 
Later that aiiciau.... • .^J-., - ^ tjr^w .allea me ea another fitter. 
She asked me if I knew who .had entered the Courtroom arid wondered 
if I had realized-the effect of that person on my client's 
testimony. 1 told her I had not recognized the problem at that 
time,"but certainly did afterwards. My. client became extremely 
upset'at. the presence of her brother in • the' Courtroom,. "There was 
absolutely no reason whatsoever for Terry Marasco to be in the 
Courtroom and had I been aware of his presence, I would have 
immediately- notified the Court of the violation of a Protective 
Order issued by the District Court occurring in the presence of 
the Court- Judge Storrs asked if I intended"to report this 
matter ^ - *ndicatecl to her that"! would do so. 
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James J* Cordova 
Carbon County Sheriff 
June 01, 2001 
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After exiting the Courtroom and out in the corridor, I had 
Stepped aside to talked to Mrs. Markosek and explain the Judge's 
ruling. During that time it appears that Mr. Marasco ended up in 
a verbal confrontation of sorts with Mr. Markosek and his 
daughter. I am concerned that this situation is going to get 
particularly more difficult as the fraud complaint by Mrs. 
Marasco is due to be filed shortly. It alleges that her son, 
Terry, fraudulently obtained her signature in transferring her 
home and property to him under representations that it was being 
done in a trustee capacity"*for a new trust when instead it 
transferred them into his name only. Because there have been 
previous problems between these parties within your jurisdiction 
and because your deputies were the bailiffs at the time, I felt 
it would be appropriate to refer this matter to you for 
investigation. If you feel that it is appropriate to refer it to 
the City Police, as the Courthouse is in Price City, please feel 
free to do so. 
Very truly yours, 
JOANE>Pp)PAS WHITE 
Attorney lat Law 
Enclosures 
JPWrsh 
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. ^:.i_ i rai ik Markosek 
vwxth euuiusures) 
nnnon 
Joane Pappas White 
Attorney at Law 
5th Street Plaza 
475 East Main - Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
(433 637-0177 
FAX (435) 637-0183 
August 23, 2000 
D. David Lambert 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
RE: Marasco v. Marasco 
Dear Mr. Lambert: 
I have now had occasion to meec with each of my clients separately 
in order to assess the possibility of settlement. Pursuant to our 
previous discussion, the Protective Orders have removed feelings of 
intimidation and each of the parties desires to continue the 
protection of the Protective Orders. Mrs. Marasco has always 
insisted that her home, real property and water be restored to her. 
In short, she wants everything that Terry had her sign transferred 
back to her immediately. Mrs. Marasco also advises me that her 
grandson came to the home while the'Protective Order was in effect, 
entered the room where business items were supposed to be stored 
for Terry and promptly took all of the late Mr. Marasco's guns out 
of the home. The estimates of the number of guns range between 50 
and 70 guns. Finally, Mrs. Marasco indicates that various collector 
automobiles were stored at the garages, associated with her home and 
those vehicles were intended to be shared between Terry and Trudy. 
Most particularly, she was very upset to find out that Terry had 
taken Trudy's name off of the 1957 Chevy which Trudy's husband 
basically restored. When I discussed that issue with Trudy, she 
indicated that her concern had always been her mother ind if her 
mother was satisfied then Trudy would not assert any separate 
claims. 
I reviewed all of the material which you provided me with respect 
to the corporation and had significant concerns aboi^ t same after 
discussing those with Mrs. Marasco. I have advised Trudy and Mrs. 
Marasco of their various interests in the property as it existed at 
the time of Mr. Marasco's death. I also have discussed the alleged 
conveyances of stock and the various methods that can be used to 
authenticate same. Although Mrs. Marasco acknowledges that her 
signature had been placed on numerous documents over the years, she 
0QQ286 
. . ^ av-.a L.anujt 
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disputes the reason for the execution of many of those items, 
including the^  shares of stock. She recalls executing many things in 
blank which were only supposed to have been used after express 
authorization by her and no such authorization was ever given. In 
short, the respective interests in the business following Mr. 
Marasco's death and the transfer of those interests has been of 
serious concern to me after talking with the family attorney and 
Mrs. 'Marasco. However, at thisr point in time Mxs, Marasco desires 
to settle this matter provided that her home, property, water and 
personal property is 'restored to hen as outli ned above. 
Please- let me know your '"client's feelings on this matter. I w:i 11 
withhold' filing the complaint which I have drafted in this matter 
in hopes that this proposal might ] ead to a resoiuti on of a ] ] of 
the issues between the parties. 
Ve ry L *. ^  - y your s, 
^ANE PAP PAS WHITE 
Attorney at Law 
JPW:jms 
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holiaday,UT 84117 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN MARASCO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No: 060701108 
Judge: Lyle Anderson 
COMES NOW, Helen Marasco, by and through counsel, William R. Hadley, and submits 
this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and replies as 
follows: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a lawsuit for attorney malpractice wherein Plaintiff Marasco claims that defendant 
White failed to file a lawsuit in a timely manner to void a deed signed by the plaintiff and for return 
to the plaintiff of certain real property located in Carbon County, Utah. 
OoQOW 
PLAINTIFF'S FACTS 
1. Plaint iff J> .1 \\uhw\ nUmst IIIIISIHIIIIJI ilmnlll in I 'W ind sln« inkiifol flu h ills nl'lii; 
estate. 
2. In,. January 1993 the plaintiff had in place an estate plan w itli a will and ti 1 1st 
essentially givina her estate to her two children, Terry Marasco and !Yudy Markosek. 
3. That the plaint >. 1 * further estate planning discussions with Richard i i . Jradley, 
an attorne> in 1 'Us • I 'tali in mid I ,»1'*' 
4. ' On October 1, 1999 the plaintiff did sign the Quit Claim Deed ~ ry Marasco 
giving the home, real property and surrounding acreage 01 ^ V A V . . cs 
located at 3545 North 1130 West, Helper, Utah to Terry Marasco. 
5. On November 30, 1999 the Plaintiff did sign the new will and trust completed by 
R ichard I I Bradley 
6. That by further conversations the plaintiff had with the famil attorney, Nick 
Sampinos, lie discovered, by a review of the Carbon County R e c o i l .>. ^ . ^ :.iat 
the Quit Claim Deed had transferred all plaintiffs land to her son, Terry Marasco. 
This information was relayed to her on January 20, 2000. 
7. Mrs, Marasco became rather 1 ipse!: in 1 lnderstandh «? this becai ise it was he* ••:*.» 1 
for her son to receive only part of the real propem. ^ut not the home and connected 
yard. 
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8. Mr. Sampinos, due to other professional duties, and not wishing to get in between 
these family members with a possible conflict of interest, discussed the matter with 
defendant attorney, Joane Pappas White. 
9. That lawyer Sampinos did send a letter to defendant, Joane Pappas White, on March 
30, 2000. 
10. That eventually Ms. White was retained by the plaintiff. 
11. That an attorney/client relationship was established between the plaintiff and 
defendant regarding the matter of the wrongfully executed deed and associated 
matters.. 
12. That Ms. White did send letters to various parties indicating that she was the attorney 
representing Ms. Marasco in the matter of the wrongfully described deed. 
13. That there was a three-year statute of limitations upon mistake and fraud claims in 
the state of Utah. 
14. That Ms. White, as the attorney for plaintiff, failed to file an action on behalf of 
plaintiff in a timely manner, therefore, barring plaintiffs claims of mistake and fraud 
against her son to return the real property. 
15. That eventually plaintiff hired other attorneys to represent her in the matter and an 
action was filed in Carbon County Seventh Judicial District Court under Marasco v. 
Marasco (hereinafter referred to (tMarasco case") Case No. 030700583 before the 
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner. 
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16. 1 'hat the cause of action in the Ma; < isco case i lp :)ii, v hich plaintiff filed to v oid the 
d e e ( i W ere (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, 
(4) fraud, (5) mistake, (6) constructive trust, and, (7) quiet, title. 
17. Thiil tin" nninil in (lit" mituM'o case dismissal its (inie-banrd (he eluinns nf Hi."tml and 
mistake. (Attached and incorporated as Exhibit A). 
• 18. 1 hat the court eventually ruled that, based upon the five o thei si it: \ i < iiig ac tions, that 
t h e r e W a s no legal or factual basis to invalidate the deed. 
19. That Findings of Fact (hereinafter "FOF") and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter 
incorporated, as Exhibit I \ I 
20. 1 hat no appeal was taken b> ;._ JUI^^. 
2 1 . That this action was then filed bv plaintiff. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendant makes logical, and reasonable arguments in their motion about, issue preclusion 
elements that appi I|f +1 1 > "***& < • « > :::i * ' = m < 1 elements \S ithout ?• \* ::|1 * kQQv ;g 1 1 li |C • rl ' 1 'r"iC time, 
plaintiff alleges thnt r t a h <:m u dew .md consistent upon two points: <1 i That A trial court must 
review all 'the facts in iho n^m n\u %L iu\ orable to the non-moving party, and
 v-; A^> gcnu^ic issues 
of material fact in dispute defeat a summary judgment. Young Electric Sign Company v. State of 
Utah and UDOT, 1,1.0 P.3d 1118 (I It A pp., ,2005), 
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Fraud and Issue Preclusion 
As defendant states in her memorandum, in issue preclusion there are four elements that must 
be satisfied: 
[1] The party against whom the issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party 
to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant action; [3] the issue 
in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Plaintiff has no argument with numbers [1] and [4] of the definition. In reference to [2] and 
[3] of issue preclusion, clearly this is impossible as the claim of mistake and fraud were dismissed 
based upon the statute of limitations, therefore these issues cannot be "identical" to the one presented 
in the instant action nor were they "completely, fully and fairly litigated." 
Plaintiff states that she had made a mistake in the property description of this deed and there 
was fraud in being told that she was signing only certain property over to her son. (Attached and 
incorporated as Exhibit C). 
Plaintiff eventually met with the family attorney, Nick Sampinos, an attorney duly licensed 
in the State of Utah. Mr. Sampinos was concerned that Mrs. Marasco was using an out-of-town 
attorney to do her estate planning documents and researched the title upon the subject property. It 
was at that time that he discovered the problem with the deed and informed her of such and set up 
an office meeting. At this meeting on or about January 12,2000, Mrs. Marasco was extremely upset. 
In the deposition of Nick Sampinos dated May 11,2004 from the Marasco case he states: 
"Q. And did you have that meeting with her? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And upon reviewing the quitclaim deed and expia^.:., * f 
signing the quitclaim deed, what was her reaction? 
A. She then remembered signing that very document, said, yes, that's my signature, now 
I remember signing that document, and I explained to her what that actually meant, 
what it was, and she began crying, was visibly upset, and she'd vacillate from being 
- from crying to being mad at herself for not having read the document more 
carefully. She expressed that several times to n • 
Q. Did she say that she had intended to g i v e n O *iOU;>e IO i L"iT\ . 
A. No. 
Q. Did she sa\ she had m * J':' lent to give her house to Terry? 
A. 1hat's corrcc;. vvnne she was alive, she nou nu intention of giving her house to 
anyone." (Sampinos Deposition pp. 38 LI 1 to 391,5, Attached and incorporated as 
Exhibit D). 
And, in the deposition, of Helen Marasco of May 11, 2004 she states: 
"Q. T ., >ingto ask somerealh p c inted questions for > 01 :i Okay? 
When Terry brought the deed for you to sign and take to ••George Harmon's office, did 
he explain to you that the deed was "giving him your house? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you understand -
A. He nevei 
Q. Did you "understand that by signing the deed that you were giving Terry" your house? 
A. No 
Q. Did George Harmon explain to you that the deed was giving your house to Terry? 
A. No, 
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Q. When Terry handed you the deed at your house, was that the first time you had seen 
the deed? 
A. Yes." (Marasco Deposition p. 46 L6 to L21. Attached and incorporated as Exhibit 
E). 
In the Marasco case, FOF #5 state: 
"Helen Marasco claims that the deed contained a mistake in the description and that 
only the farm portion of the property should have been included in the transfer." 
Further FOF #10: 
"Helen's testimony was consistent with Richard Bradley's except that she testified 
that she only wanted to transfer the farm and not the residence. This raises a question 
of mistake, not a question of undue influence, and before taking evidence the court 
ruled that the claim of mistake is time-barred." 
Thereafter, in the COL, the court stated that the causes of action in which the plaintiff was 
seeking to void the deed were: (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty, (4) fraud, (5) mistake, (6) constructive trust and (7) quiet title. 
The COL further stated: 
"#10. Thus, the claim under the facts presented is that of mistake in the deed 
description. 
#11. Based on the evidence the court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to the 
relief she has requested. 
#12. Any claims of mistake or fraud are time-barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26-
xSee also attached Exhibit A, the hearing of April 7,2005 upon an oral motion for 
dismissal filed by defendant, Terry Marasco in the Marasco case. Participating was Ned Stone 
for plaintiff, Helen Marasco, and E. David Lambert for defendant, Terry Marasco. In argument 
Mr. Lambert stated, "You can only then argue over the description. And that, your honor, is a 
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For purposes of this motion defe ndant has 1 used, the definition of mistake as: 
"A mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous mental 
condition, conception,,, or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehension, or 
misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission done or suffered by one or both 
parties, without its erroneous character being intended or known at the time 
The elements of fraud are: 
(1) That the defendant made a false or misleading statement to, that the defendant 
either knew the statement was false or misleading, or that the defendant made it with 
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, (2) that the statement was of material fact, 
(3) that the defendant made the statement with the intent that the plaintiff would rely 
on the false or misleading representation, and (5) that the plaintiff reasonably relied 
on the false or misleading representation, and (6) that the plaintiff suffered damages 
as a result of relying on the false representation,, x i ' s! 
As to undue influu**,w. 
"In a case to declare a will invalid because of undue influence, there must be 
an exhibition of more than influence or suggestion, there must be substantial proof 
of an overpowering of the testator's volition at the time the will was made, to the 
extent he is compelled to do that which he would not have done had he been free 
from,,, such controlling influence' so that the will represents the desire of the person 
exercising the influence rather than that of the testator. This showing need, not be 
based on proof of physical coercion or contraint." In re LavelPs Estate, Miner thai 
v. First Security Bank et a/., 248 P.2d, 122, 253 (Utah 1952). 
mistake issue. If the wrong description was placed in the deed, that's a mistake already..." (p. 8 
LI 5 - LI 7). "...if there's some variation in the description of the deed from what Mrs. Marasco 
intended, that is a mistake argument. And the mistake part of this case has been dismissed 
because of statute of limitations." (p. 9 LI 3-1 1,7) By J\ ir Stone "That is simply a mistake 
argument. A mistake as to the description of the deed." (p. 23 L21 - L23). "Thus there's been a 
question raised as what she intended transfer, what she intended to transfer by the deed. This is a 
question of mistake, not a question of undue influence. The court has previously ruled that the 
plaintiff mistake as time-barred. The statute of limitations with regard to mistake had expired 
before the complaint was filed." (p. 27 L3 - L9). 
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In order to prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment three elements must be met. Berrett v. 
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1994): 
"First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. Second, the 
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must be 
'the acceptance or retention of the benefit by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value.9 " 
A constructive trust is defined as: 
"A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the person 
by whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another 
on the grounds that its acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that 
he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property." 
Restatement, 2nd, Trusts § 1(e). 
Finally, an action for quiet title is defined as: 
"One in which plaintiff asserts his own estate, declares generally that defendant 
claims some estate in the land, without defining it, and avers that the claim is without 
foundation, and calls on defendant to set forth the nature of his claim, so that it may 
be determined by decree." Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition 1979. 
Clearly, the elements of fraud and mistake versus the elements of undue influence, unjust 
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and quiet title, although having some 
crossover elements, are not identical to the ones presented in the instant action nor were they 
completely fully and fairly litigated in the Marasco case as the presiding judge ruled that the mistake 
and fraud claims were time-barred. Thus, evidence to the elements of each claim were not presented 
and completely and fully, fairly litigated. 
The burden of establishing each of the elements of res judicata as in Zoofelt v. Haste, 142 
P.3d 594 (Utah App. 2006), is on the party invoking the doctrine in this case. (Citations omitted.) 
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a( \>l luteru I esloppc 1 can yield an unjust outcome if applied without reasonable consideration 
and due care.'" 3d Construction and Dev. LLC v t )hJSnjiulurd f itr In\ i 'n . I I ' I id I -C \l Kali, 
2005) quoted in Zoofelt. 
Flit; \ A /»«m «i VJM nil sf Jlal. " 11'l !,i, tiic claim under the tacts presented is that of mistake in 
the deed description, (C< >l. -10) land] "this raises the question of mistake, nnl ,i iinr-fnn M umltr 
influence, |iiinuij Iciore taking evidence the court ruled the claim, of mistake is time-barred," (FOF 
#ioo 
Thus, these claims for mistake and fraud are still ripe for adjudication and summary judgment 
is inappropriate. 
Plaintiff and Defendant had an established attorney/client relationship and 
the malpractice claim should go forward. 
Plaintiff met with defendant in earlv V)Qt) h\ \ n i n n l tmm «lr IIHWIV inoinq. isjick 
Sampinos. 
"Q. Why i\u\ \ Iierealicr n/l'er IIcien to Joane Pappas-White? 
A. Around, that time and a little prior to that, I'd been trying to / ••: ^ ^ ; uy 
practice. I was expanding my ranching operation and wanted .v.
 =- * w t »> mueii 
litigation work as I possibly could and just try to focus , i n> municipal clients, 
transactional staff and that sort of thing, so that was a good opportunity. 
I didn't want to become embroiled in a family situation that would perhaps go on for 
a long time that would require my devotion of time that I really didn't have a lot of 
extra to give, so that was the reason that I referred her to another attorney." 
(Sampinos Deposition pp. 39 I ,6-23 Attached and incorporated as Exhibit D), 
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Mr. Sampinos also directed a letter to Ms. White regarding these claims on March 30,2000. 
(Attached and incorporated as Exhibit F). 
Then, in a letter dated August 23,2000 defendant states to attorney David Lambert: 
"Mrs. Marasco has always insisted that her home, real property, and water be restored 
to her. In short, she wants everything that Terry had her sign transferred back to her 
immediately...However, at this point in time Mrs. Marasco desires to settle this 
matter provided that her home, property, water and personal property is restored to 
her as outlined above." 
Of great import is a further statement made in this letter: 
"I will withhold filing the complaint which I have drafted in this matter in hopes that 
this proposal might lead to a resolution of all of the issues between the parties." 
(Attached and incorporated as Exhibit G). 
On June 1,2001 defendant states in a letter to James J. Cordova, Carbon County Sheriff, that: 
"I am concerned that this situation is going to get particularly more difficult as the 
fraud complaint by Mrs. Marasco is due to be filed shortly. It alleges that her son, 
Terry Marasco, fraudulently obtained her signature in transferring her home and 
property to him under representations that it was being done in a trustee capacity for 
a new trust, when instead it transferred them into his name only." (Attached and 
incorporated as Exhibit H). 
Finally, defendant mailed plaintiff a quit-claim deed on October 17,2001 which defendant 
instructed plaintiff could present to her son, Terry Marasco, to quit-claim deed the real property back 
to plaintiff. (Attached and incorporated as Exhibit I). 
Such facts establish an attorney/client relationship between plaintiff and defendant. The fact 
that defendant knew of the facts and intended to file a complaint alleging mistake and/or fraud 
against Terry Marasco for recovery of this real property, and told plaintiff she had filed the 
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complaint, precludes summary judgment for legal malpractice for missing the statute of limitations 
mi lllhir IIMIIII Jim! mistake i Linns ol Uic plauitilL 
CONCLUSION 
Again, it is an impossibility for the mistake and fraud claims to have been fully litigated in 
the underlying Marasco case aclion -r- Mv F( W nit) t "i >l indicated tlul iiustake and fraud were 
dismissed a .. u»the statute of limitations. Only the claims of undue influence, unjust enrichment, 
breach *" JnM " "iislriktiu lui'-l and quiet 11tie had direct evidence presented ^ ^ 
elements. ! ;<r*\ -.-lainis Jo not 111 the definitions of fraud or mistake, ^ J *j 
. prc^chi J-. !»^iiidii.;-autice action against defendant is still ripe for prosecut »___. 
Therefore, plainti!V requests that S° ' -< ; " 111 i\ Jci\t^\I 
DATED this ^ day of June 2007. 
WILLIAM R. H A D ^ ^ ^ - — 
Attorney for Plainfi ir*^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was mailed to the individual(s) named below by placing a true and correct copy in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, this ^ 7 day of June 2007. 
Michael F. Skolnick 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
> - i T ^fi^O?^ 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward - Legal Secretary 
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MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK - #4671 
J. KEVIN MURPHY - # 5768 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED 
MAY 2 1 2007 
SEVENTHDiSTRlCTCOURTS 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN MARASCO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060701108 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
Through counsel, defendant Joane Pappas White ("attorney White") submits this motion in 
support of her motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a lawsuit for attorney malpractice brought by plaintiff Helen Marasco ("Mrs. 
Marasco") against attorney White. Mrs. Marasco accuses attorney White of negligence and breach 
of contract, arising from her representation of Mrs. Marasco in a family dispute over the ownership 
ofcertainrealproperty in Carbon County, Utah. (Complaint, attached as "A," ffi[ 43-56.) In brief. 
000029 
Mrs. Marasco alleges that she retained attorney White to help her recover the subject real property 
from her son, Terry Marasco. (Id. ffl[ 24-27.) Mrs. Marasco had conveyed that property to Terry 
Marasco, but alleges that said conveyance should have been set aside based upon theories of mistake 
or fraud. (Id. ffif 17-18,27-32.) 
Mrs. Marasco claims that attorney White failed to timely file suit against Terry Marasco in 
order to recover the property. Represented by a different attorney, Mrs. Marasco did file suit and 
proceeded to trial in an effort to recover the property. However, her claims of mistake and fraud 
were dismissed on grounds that they had not been timely filed under the applicable statute of 
limitation. (Id. fflf 37-40.) Various other theories for recovery of the property were advanced in that 
underlying lawsuit, and were rejected on their merits. (Id. ffl[ 37, 41.) 
Now, in her malpractice lawsuit against attorney White, Mrs. Marasco alleges that her 
mistake and fraud claims would have been "viable" had they been timely filed. (Id. *|f 47.) She 
concludes, therefore, that her underlying lawsuit would have succeeded, and she would have 
recovered the property from her son, but for attorney White's failure to timely file the claims of 
mistake and fraud. (Id. «flj 48, 56.) 
Attorney White disagrees, and requests summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Marasco's 
attorney malpractice suit. As follows, summary dismissal is appropriate based upon the final 
judgment entered in Mrs. Marasco's underlying lawsuit, Helen Marasco v. Terry Marasco, Seventh 
Judicial District No. 030700583. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as "B.") 
Page -2-
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Certain findings and conclusions, entered following trial of that lawsuit, defeat Mrs. Marasco's 
claims of mistake and fraud, on their merits, regarding the underlying property transfer. Therefore, 
even if those claims were time-barred, they also fail under the principle of issue preclusion. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Preliminary Statement 
Attorney White recognizes that in its consideration of a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court views all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, this lawsuit for 
attorney malpractice is inextricably related to Mrs. Marasco's underlying lawsuit, Marasco v. 
Marasco, in which she sought to recover the subject property from her son, Terry Marasco. In that 
underlying lawsuit, the trial court entered certain findings of fact and conclusions of law that were 
adverse to Mrs. Marasco. This Statement of Undisputed Material Facts incorporates certain 
allegations of Mrs. Marasco's present complaint against attorney White. Attorney White hotly 
contests many of those allegations. She fully believes that, were this case ever to proceed to trial, 
she would disprove the substantive allegations Ms. Marasco relies upon in support of her malpractice 
claims. Nevertheless, for purposes of this motion only, those allegations may be taken as true. 
This Fact Statement also incorporates certain findings and conclusions (the '"underlying 
FFCL") entered adversely to Mrs. Marasco in her underlying lawsuit. Those underlying FFCL are, 
as will be explained in the Argument section of this Memorandum, legally insulated from dispute. 
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Undisputed Facts 
1. Mrs. Marasco is a widow whose husband died in 1992. (Complaint If 7.) 
2. Having inherited the bulk of her husband's estate, Mrs. Marasco in mid-1999 sought 
financial and legal advice regarding her own estate planning. (Complaint <f 6; underlying FFCL pp. 
2-3 fl 6-8.) 
3. The estate planning included plans for the disposition of Mrs. Marasco's real property, 
consisting of about 7.5 acres of land which includes Mrs. Marasco's residence, acreage which is 
farmed by her son, Terry Marasco, and a mobile home where Terry Marasco's son (Mrs. Marasco's 
grandson) and his family reside. (Underlying FFCL p. 2 *| 3.) 
4. The options for Mrs. Marasco's estate planning, as discussed with her accountant and with 
an estate planning attorney, included creation of a trust to hold certain of Mrs. Marasco's personal 
and real property. In conjunction with, or as an alternative to the trust, the options included transfer 
of Mrs. Marasco's above-described real property to her son, Terry Marasco. (Complaint | f 9-10; 
underlying FFCL pp. 2-3 1fH 6, 8.) 
5. Terry Marasco participated in Mrs. Marasco's initial meeting with the estate planning 
attorney, and Terry asked the attorney about transferring Mrs. Marasco's real property to him, rather 
than transferring it into a trust. A discussion about this option was discussed among Mrs. Marasco, 
Terry Marasco, and the estate planning attorney. (Underlying FFCL p. 8 ffif 7-8.) 
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6. There are conflicting accounts of that discussion. According to the estate planning 
attorney, Mrs. Marasco announced that she intended to make a lifetime transfer of the real 
property-specifically, her residence and the farmland-to Terry Marasco. However, according to 
Mrs. Marasco, she stated an intention to transfer only the farmland, and not her residence, to Terry. 
(Underlying FFCL p. 3 1fij 9-10.) 
7. After the above-described discussion, the estate planning attorney drafted a quit-claim 
deed for the property, naming Helen Marasco as the grantor and Terry Marasco as the grantee. The 
deed as drafted by the estate planning attorney did not include the legal description of the property. 
Terry Marasco took the quit-claim deed to another law office, the Harmond office, where the legal 
description was inserted into the quit-claim deed. (Underlying FFCL pp. 3-4 ff 11-12.) 
8. Terry Marasco did not instruct the Harmond law office as to the proper content of said 
legal description. He did notify Mrs. Marasco that the quit-claim deed was completed and ready for 
her signature. (Underlying FFCL p. 4 IFf 12-13.) 
9. On October 1, 1999, Mrs. Marasco, unaccompanied by Terry Marasco, signed the quit-
claim deed at the Harmond law office. Someone at the Harmond office then caused the deed to be 
recorded. (Underlying FFCL p. 4 f 14.) 
10. The trial court in the underlying lawsuit found the following regarding Mrs. Marasco's 
execution of the quit-claim deed: "When Helen Marasco signed the deed, she believed she had 
Page -5-
000033 
signed cour place' to Terry Marasco, and she acknowledged that cour place' included both the 
residence and the farrn[land]." (Underlying FFCL p. 4 ^ 15.) 
11. About four days after Mrs. Marasco signed the quit-claim deed, she had a "serious 
argument" with Terry Marasco regarding some missing money. The money, apparently the property 
of a trucking business operated by Terry, had been kept in a safe in Mrs. Marasco's residence. Terry 
Marasco believed that the money had been taken by his sister, Trudy. He was upset with Mrs. 
Marasco "for not insisting that Trudy give it back." (Underlying FFCL p. 5 ^ 18-19.) 
12. The trial court in the underlying lawsuit found the following regarding Mrs. Marasco's 
response to the argument with Terry: "As a result of the argument, Helen changed her mind about 
Terry having the Property. The real reason for this action is that she is angry at Terry about what he 
said in that argument." (Underlying FFCL p. 5 f 20.) 
13. For purposes of this motion only, it can be assumed, as alleged by Mrs. Marasco, that 
she retained attorney White soon after the argument with Terry, in October 1999, to represent her 
in efforts to recover the real property that had been conveyed by the quit-claim deed to Terry. 
(Complaint f 24.) 
14. Attorney White attempted to resolve the property dispute between Mrs. Marasco and 
Terry Marasco extrajudicially, but was unsuccessful. (Complaint ff 28-29.) 
15. Also for purposes of this motion only, it can be assumed that attorney White did not file 
a lawsuit on Mrs. Marasco's behalf. By the time Mrs. Marasco consulted substitute counsel, the 
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limitations period for filing a lawsuit based upon mistake or fraud had expired. (Complaint «|J 36.) 
16. The underlying lawsuit filed by Mrs. Marasco's substitute counsel alleged the following 
bases to avoid or rescind the October 1999 quit-claim deed: (1) undue influence; (2) unjust 
enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) fraud; (5) mistake; (6) constructive trust; and (7) quiet 
title. (Underlying FFCL p. 61f 1.) 
17. Before trial of the underlying lawsuit, the trial court dismissed on motion Mrs. Marasco's 
claims of mistake and of fraud, ruling that such claims were time-barred under the limitations period 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002). (Underlying FFCL pp. 1, 8 f 12.) 
18. After hearing the trial evidence, the trial court rejected, on their merits, all other claims 
alleged by Mrs. Marasco as grounds to avoid or rescind the quit-claim deed. However, based upon 
a stipulation by Terry Marasco, the trial court did order that Mrs. Marasco would have a life estate 
in that part of the property used as her residence. (Underlying FFCL pp. 6-, Yil 6, 9, 15.) 
19. In addition to those already quoted above, the trial court's underlying FFCL included the 
following specific findings and conclusions: 
The defendant [Terry Marasco] did not instruct the Harmond law 
office as to the legal description [of the property to be conveyed], and 
the defendant never looked at the legal description or saw the deed 
until he saw it in connection with the present legal action. (Finding 
No. 12.) 
There is no suggestion of undue influence or unfair conduct by Terry 
Marasco in connection with any of the events surrounding the 
decision to make the deed or the signing of the deed. (Finding No. 
16.) 
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The Court concludes that it was plaintiffs intent and her own will to 
transfer the Property to the defendant and that the defendant has met 
his burden of proof to show no actual undue influence. (Conclusion 
No. 6.) 
[T]he defendant did not do anything that was unfair and did not take 
unfair advantage of the plaintiff. (Conclusion No. 13.) 
Regarding the vulnerable adult claim, the defendant did not engage 
in any conduct or practice with the intent to deceive or wrongfully 
deprive the plaintiff of her property. (Conclusion No. 14.) 
There is no legal or factual basis to grant plaintiff relief from the deed 
. . . nor is there any inequitable conduct by defendant upon which to 
base a decision to invalidate the deed on any ground. (Conclusion 
No. 16.) 
Helen [Marasco] continues to live in her home on the Property and 
Terry always intended for her to live there as long as she wants to do 
so. (Finding No. 23.) 
ARGUMENT 
Due to Issue Preclusion, the Judgment in the Underlying 
Lawsuit Bars Mrs. Marasco's Malpractice Complaint against 
Attorney White. 
Case within a Case 
A lawsuit for attorney malpractice is distinctive, in that the aggrieved former-client plaintiff 
must prove a "case within a case." See, e.g., Glencore, Ltd. v. Ince, 972 P.2d 376. 379080 (Utah 
1998). In the current lawsuit against attorney White, Mrs. Marasco must therefore be able to prove 
that if her claims of mistake and fraud had been timely filed, she would have prevailed on them. In 
other words, this attorney malpractice lawsuit succeeds or fails upon Mrs. Marasco's allegation that 
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she had "a viable claim for mistake and [sic: or] fraud," had such claims been timely filed. 
(Complaint 147.) 
Issue Preclusion Elements 
Mrs. Marasco's attorney malpractice lawsuit fails, because certain findings and conclusions, 
entered by the trial court in the underlying Marasco v. Marasco lawsuit, preclude her from proving 
necessary elements of mistake and of fraud. The operative principle is issue preclusion. Issue 
preclusion bars a party from relitigating, in a subsequent lawsuit, facts and issues that were litigated 
by that party in a prior lawsuit. Macris & Associates v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93 % 19, 16 P.3d 
1214,1219. For issue preclusion to apply, the following elements must be satisfied: 
[1] The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have 
been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; [3] the issue in the first action must 
have been completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 UT App 326 \ 9,142 P.3d 594, 597 (quoting and citing authority). 
Mistake and Fraud Elements 
In her underlying lawsuit, Mrs. Marasco's claims of mistake and fraud were dismissed 
because they were time-barred. To prove, in this lawsuit, that her claim of mistake was "viable,'' 
Mrs. Marasco must prove mistake, which is defined as follows: 
A mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but 
erroneous mental condition, conception, or conviction induced by 
ignorance, misapprehension, or misunderstanding, resulting in some 
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act or omission done or suffered by one or both parties, without its 
erroneous character being intended or known at the time. 
Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100 {^ 20, 40 
P.3d 581, 585, quoting 27A AmJur.2d Equity § 7 (1996). 
To prove the viability of her fraud claim, Mrs. Marasco must prove the following: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be 
false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact 
rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage. 
Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), citing Dugan v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). 
Preclusion of Mistake and Fraud Elements 
There should be no dispute regarding the first and third elements of issue preclusion against 
Mrs. Marasco. First, she was the party plaintiff in the underlying, Marasco v. Marasco lawsuit in 
which she attempted to recover the property conveyed to Terry Marasco. As to the third element, 
the Marasco v. Marasco lawsuit was fully and fairly litigated, inasmuch as no appeal was taken from 
the judgment. Therefore, that judgment is final, and a presumption of regularity applies to it. See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County Commas, 589 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Utah 1979). 
Regarding the fourth element of issue preclusion, it is true that, nominally, Mrs. Marasco's 
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claims of mistake and fraud, in her underlying lawsuit, were rejected not on their merits, but upon 
statute of limitations grounds. However, Mrs. Marasco's five other claims (Fact Statement ^ 16) 
were rejected on their merits. In considering and rejecting the merits of those claims, the trial court 
made particular findings and rulings that are final, were not appealed, and are therefore not 
susceptible to collateral attack in this attorney malpractice lawsuit. 
Those findings and rulings satisfy the second element of issue preclusion. That is, they 
squarely defeat identical issues that Mrs. Marasco must prove in order to prevail in her present claim 
of attorney malpractice. Regarding mistake, the trial court in the underlying lawsuit was explicit: 
"When Helen Marasco signed the deed, she believed she had signed 'our place' to Terry Marasco, 
and she acknowledged that 'our place' included both the residence and the farmland]." (Undisputed 
Fact Statement % 10.) If there were any doubt about the impact of that ruling, it was erased by the 
finding of the trial court, advantaged by its ability to assess witness credibility, as to why Mrs. 
Marasco sought to rescind the quit-claim deed: she had engaged in an argument with Terry Marasco, 
and "[a]s a result of the argument, Helen changed her mind about Terry having the Property. The 
real reason for this action is that she is angry at Terry about what he said in that argument." 
(Undisputed Fact Statement f 12.) 
There is, therefore, no way for Mrs. Marasco, in this "case within a case," to prove that her 
conveyance of the property to her son was "induced by ignorance, misapprehension, or 
misunderstanding," Utah Coal and Lumber, supra. Such allegation was rejected in the underlying 
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lawsuit. Issue preclusion bars her from relitigating it in this one. Accordingly, she has no argument, 
before this Court, that her claim of mistake was "viable." 
Turning to fraud, the judgment in the underlying lawsuit was even more emphatically adverse 
to Mrs. Marasco. As already observed regarding mistake, the trial court found that Mrs. Marasco 
knew the extent of the conveyed property when she signed the deed, and her real reason for suing 
her son was the argument she had with him. Additionally, the trial court in the underlying case 
found "no suggestion of . . . unfair conduct by Terry Marasco in connection with any of the events 
surrounding the decision to make the deed or the signing of the deed." (Undisputed Fact «fl 19.) Her 
son "did not engage in any conduct or practice with the intent to deceive or wrongfully deprive the 
plaintiff of her property." (Id.) Her son "did not do anything that was unfair and did not take unfair 
advantage of the plaintiff." (Id.) Ultimately, the trial court found "no legal or factual basis to grant 
plaintiff relief from the deed . . . . " (Id.) 
In short, the court in the underlying Marasco v. Marasco case found that Terry Marasco made 
no knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact upon which Mrs. Marasco relied, reasonably or 
otherwise, when she signed the quit-claim deed. See Andalex, supra. In the present attorney 
malpractice lawsuit, Mrs. Marasco cannot relitigate those findings and rulings. Her claim of fraud, 
therefore, is not "viable." Like her claim of mistake, such claim cannot sustain this malpractice 
lawsuit against attorney Pappas. 
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CONCLUSION 
Issue preclusion "serves the important policy of preventing previously litigated issues from 
being relitigated." Maoris, 2000 UT 93 \ 19, 16 P.3d at 1219. Key elements of Mrs. Marasco's 
claims of mistake and fraud were rejected in her underlying lawsuit against her son. Issue preclusion 
now bars her from relitigating those elements. Mrs. Marasco's present attorney malpractice lawsuit, 
which depends upon proof that her mistake and fraud claims were "viable," must therefore be 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/&ay of May, 2007. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
fl Haste, Inc., and Harry Gounaris appeal 
the district court's ruling granting Jimmy Zufelt's 
motion to strike Gounaris's pleadings and 
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, 
Haste and Gounaris argue that the district court 
erred by concluding that the doctrine of res 
judicata barred Gounaris from asserting an 
ownership interest in Haste and therefore 
Gounaris lacked standing to act on behalf of 
Haste. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND1 
f2 Gounaris and Steven Kallinikos 
incorporated Haste as equal shareholders for the 
purpose of doing business as Burger Supreme. 
In 1997, Haste sold the restaurant to Richard and 
Connie Nuttall in exchange for two notes, one of 
which was made payable to Haste for $72,000 
(the Note). In 1998, Kallinikos entered into a 
lease with Jimmy Zufelt, the managing member 
of World Plaza, L.L.C.2 In April 1999, 
Kallinikos 
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abandoned the leased premises and executed a 
note to Zufelt for $28,000 to resolve obligations 
fastcase 
under the lease. Kallinikos experienced financial 
difficulties and obtained a loan for $20,000 from 
Gounaris in 1999. In February 2000, Kallinikos 
assigned his interest in the Note to Gounaris to 
satisfy monies owed to Gounaris. 
1J3 In September 2000, Zufelt filed a 
complaint in the district court against Kallinikos 
and Haste seeking recovery of monies owed him 
from the failed lease. On February 13, 2001, 
Kallinikos filed a chapter 7 petition for 
bankruptcy.3 The bankruptcy trustee filed a 
complaint seeking avoidance of the assignment 
of Kallinikos's interest in the Note to Gounaris. 
At trial in the bankruptcy court, Kallinikos 
testified that he continued doing business 
through the Haste entity after the sale of the 
restaurant. Gounaris testified that he no longer 
participated in the entity. The bankruptcy court 
found that no documentation was offered to 
indicate when or how Gounaris relinquished his 
ownership interest in Haste. The bankruptcy 
court concluded that Gounaris owned a fifty 
percent interest in the Note; was a fifty percent 
stockholder, officer, and director of Haste; and 
was an insider for purposes of the bankruptcy 
case. The bankruptcy court avoided the 
assignment of Kallinikos's interest in the Note. 
[^4 On July 16, 2002, the bankruptcy trustee 
filed a motion to intervene and a motion to strike 
the pleadings and any defenses filed by Gounaris 
on behalf of Haste in the district court case. The 
district court granted the motion to intervene. In 
June 2004, Zufelt filed a motion to strike or 
dismiss, or enter judgment for lack of standing, 
in which Zufelt asserted that the issue of 
ownership had been previously litigated in the 
bankruptcy court and that collateral estoppel 
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prevented Haste and Gounaris from relitigating 
the issue of ownership in Haste. Gounaris 
asserted that he has always been a fifty percent 
owner of Haste, is entitled to a portion of Haste's 
assets, and has standing to litigate Haste's 
defenses against Zufelt's action. 
f 5 The district court, applying the doctrine 
of res judicata, found Gounaris had no 
ownership interest in Haste and therefore lacked 
standing to file pleadings or assert any defenses 
on behalf of Haste. The district court found: (1) 
Gounaris was a party to the action in the 
bankruptcy court, (2) the ultimate issue before 
the bankruptcy court was whether Kallinikos's 
transfer of his interest in the Note was 
fraudulent, but that the bankruptcy court heard 
evidence and made findings regarding 
Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste, (3) 
Gounaris had an opportunity to fully and fairly 
litigate the issue regarding his ownership interest 
in Haste since Gounaris testified before the 
bankruptcy court that he relinquished his 
ownership interest in Haste and provided tax 
returns showing relinquishment, and (4) the case 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits 
wherein the bankruptcy court avoided 
Kallinikos's transfer to Gounaris. 
1(6 The district court also noted that, 
although the bankruptcy court's findings may not 
have addressed the precise issue of Gounaris's 
ownership interest in Haste with perfect clarity, 
reasonable conclusions could be drawn from the 
testimony and evidence presented before the 
bankruptcy court that Gounaris has no 
ownership interest in Haste. The district court 
granted Zufelt's motion to strike Gounaris's 
pleadings and motion for summary judgment. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
\1 Haste and Gounaris appeal the district 
court's ruling granting Zufelt's motion to strike 
Gounaris's pleadings and motion for summary 
judgment. We review a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, affording no 
deference to the trial court. See Ford v. 
American Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, 
Tf21, 98 P.3d 15. A party is entitled to summary 
festcase 
judgment if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and "the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). 
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Specifically, Haste and Gounaris argue that the 
district court erred by concluding that the 
doctrine of res judicata barred Gounaris from 
asserting defenses on behalf of Haste. 
ANALYSIS 
The Doctrine of Res Judicata 
Tf8 The district court ruled that the doctrine 
of res judicata, specifically issue preclusion, 
barred Gounaris from claiming an ownership 
interest in Haste and that without an ownership 
interest Gounaris lacked standing to act on 
behalf of Haste. A trial court's determination o\ 
whether res judicata bars an action presents a 
question of law. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f l7, 16 P.3d 1214. 
We review such questions for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial 
court. See id. 
f9 "Tssue preclusion, also referred to as 
collateral estoppel, prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating issues which were once 
adjudicated on the merits and have resulted in a 
final judgment.'" 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. 
Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307, 
f 18, 117 P.3d 1082 (alteration omitted) (quoting 
Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, 
Inc., 2005 UT 19, f27, 110 P.3d 678). In order 
for issue preclusion to apply, four elements must 
be present: 
"[1] The party against whom issue 
preclusion is asserted must have been a party to 
or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; [2] the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; [3] the issue in 
the first action must have been completely, fully, 
and fairly litigated; and [4] the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." 
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Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Tremco 
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19 at 127, 110 P.3d 
678). "If any one of these requirements is not 
satisfied, there can be no preclusion." Hill v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 245 
(Utah 1992). The burden of establishing each of 
the elements of res judicata is on Zufelt, the 
party invoking the doctrine in this case. See 
PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, 2000 
UT App 20, 15, 995 P.2d 1252; see also Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). 
The specific issues of the instant case focus on 
whether the second and third elements are 
present. 
^10 Gounaris argues that the issue decided 
by the bankruptcy court and the issue before the 
district court were not identical. We agree. 
"What is critical [in determining identical issues] 
is whether the issue that was actually litigated in 
the first suit was essential to resolution of that 
suit and is the same factual issue as that raised in 
a second suit." Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 
1226, 1230 (Utah 1983). 
I l l First, the findings made by the 
bankruptcy court do not factually support the 
district court's conclusion that Gounaris had no 
ownership of Haste. In fact, the bankruptcy 
court, to the extent it addressed Gounaris's 
ownership interest at all, found that Gounaris 
was a fifty percent stockholder, officer, and 
director of Haste and that he owned a fifty 
percent interest in the Note.4 
f l2 Second, the issue actually litigated in 
the bankruptcy court is different than the issue 
raised in the district court. The bankruptcy court 
addressed the issue of the avoidability of the 
transfer of Kallinikos's one-half interest in the 
Note to Gounaris and held that the transfer was 
avoidable under the bankruptcy code. The 
district court addressed the issue of Gounaris's 
ownership interest in Haste, and found that res 
judicata applied because the bankruptcy court 
heard testimony and made findings regarding 
Gounaris's ownership interest in Haste. 
113 The district court in its ruling noted 
that the ultimate issue before it was Gounaris's 
iistcase 
ownership interest in Haste, and that while the 
"[bankruptcy court . . . may not [have] 
address[ed] the precise issue with perfect clarity, 
, . , that reasonable conclusions could be drawn 
from the testimony and the evidence presented 
before the [bankruptcy court which support a 
finding that issue preclusion is applicable." Issue 
preclusion, however, requires that the issue 
decided in the 
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prior adjudication be identical to the one in the 
subsequent action. The issue of Gounaris's 
ownership interest in Haste is not the same issue 
decided by the bankruptcy court. The issue 
before the bankruptcy court was whether the 
transfer to Gounaris was avoidable as a 
preferential transfer without regard to whether 
Gounaris had an ownership interest in Haste. 
114 Finally, the issue of Gounaris's 
ownership interest in Haste was not an essential 
issue in the bankruptcy court case. To avoid the 
transfer, the trustee was required to prove that 
Gounaris was an insider of Kallinikos, which 
prompted a discussion on Gounaris's ownership 
interest in Haste. The determination of 
ownership interest, however, was not essential to 
prove that Gounaris was an insider. The 
bankruptcy court concluded that even if 
Gounaris did not maintain an ownership interest 
in Haste he was still an insider due to his 
sufficiently close relationship with Kallinikos. 
115 For issue preclusion to apply, the 
parties must have had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue. See 3D Constr. & Dev., 
L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co, 2005 UT 
App 307,120, 117 P.3d 1082; see also Macris & 
Assocs, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,144, 
16 P.3d 1214. The issue of Gounaris's ownership 
interest in Haste was not the central issue in the 
bankruptcy case, and was only superficially 
addressed in discussions pertaining to the 
determination of whether Gounaris was an 
insider. Therefore, we cannot say that Gounaris 
had an opportunity to completely and fully 
litigate the issue. Moreover, ""collateral estoppel 
can yield an unjust outcome if applied without 
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reasonable consideration and due care."1 3D 
Constr., 2005 UT App 307 at f 22, 117 P.3d 
1082 (quoting Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 
1(15, 99 P.3d 842). And courts ,rmust carefully 
consider whether granting preclusive effect to a 
prior decision is appropriate.'" Id. (quoting 
Buckner, 2004 UT 78 at f 15, 99 P.3d 842). 
*P6 The issue of Gounaris's ownership 
interest in Haste is not the same issue decided by 
the bankruptcy court. The ownership issue was 
not essential to the determination of the 
avoidability of the transfer, and was not 
completely and fully litigated. The 
circumstances of this case, along with the policy 
considerations implicated by issue preclusion, 
make it apparent that issue preclusion is 
inappropriate here. 
CONCLUSION 
f l7 The hallmarks of issue preclusion— 
identity and centrality of issue and full and fair 
litigation—are not present in this case, and 
therefore issue preclusion is inapplicable. In so 
ruling, we do not decide whether Gounaris 
actually has or had an ownership interest in 
Haste; we merely note that the district court 
improperly relied on res judicata to make the 
challenged rulings. We reverse and remand to 
the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
f l8 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. 
DAVIS, Judge. 
Notes: 
1. "When reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Carrier v. 
Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, %39 104 P.3d 
1208. The facts are presented accordingly. 
2. The parties dispute whether Kallinikos 
entered into the lease individually or as an agent 
of Haste. 
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3. On February 14, 2001, Zufelt amended the 
complaint in the district court case to dismiss 
Kallinikos, in compliance with the automatic 
stay of the bankruptcy case, and instead included 
Gounaris. The amended complaint asserted that 
Kallinikos assigned the Note to Gounaris, and 
the assignment of the Note to Gounaris rendered 
Kallinikos and Haste insolvent. 
4. We address the issue of res judicata as raised 
by the parties. However, the bankruptcy court 
found that Gounaris had a fifty percent interest 
in the Note. 
